

Risk Management 103: Patient Safety and Adverse Event Analysis

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Patricia Stahura, RN, MSN Senior Patient Safety Analyst ECRI Institute





Learning Objectives

- Review primary care patient safety initiatives
- Examine elements of a patient safety program
- Identify barriers to event identification and reporting
- Simulate a root-cause analysis
- Describe the steps from analysis to action
- Recommend measures to ensure sustained improvements





Patient Safety in Primary Care





Primary Care Visits



Over 90 million clinic visits to health centers occur annually in the United States

1 billion ambulatory visits occur annually in the United States







Challenges

- Patient safety is a young discipline
- Most studies focus on hospital care
- Primary care safety has different issues than care in hospital settings
- Primary care studies focus on access and overall quality
- System vulnerabilities and safety issues are not investigated
- People are living longer, with chronic conditions, community care
- Knowledge and skills are required from providers
- Patient autonomy is paramount





Research in Ambulatory Patient Safety: A 10-Year Review

- More diverse population of patients
- Healthy; chronic conditions; or acute need of hospitalization
- Organizational structures
- Challenging information exchange
- Transitions between primary care, specialist, home care, pharmacy, laboratory
- Patient responsibility





AHRQ Report: Patient Safety in Ambulatory Care

- Adverse harm from medical or patient self-management
- Possibility of patient errors
- Electronic health records (EHRs) and other technological tools
- Utilize different, and noninteroperable, electronic platforms
- Short visits, long interval between visits or referrals or diagnostic studies
- Intense time pressure
- Coordination of care
- Presence and composition of team





NPSF: 8 Recommendations for Achieving Total System Safety

- 1. Establish and maintain a safety culture
- 2. Centralize and coordinate oversight of patient safety
- 3. Establish a common set of patient safety metrics
- 4. Improve funding in order to better understand and prevent safety hazards
- 5. Deliver safety across the entire continuum
- 6. Support the health care workforce (e.g., providers, nurses, medical assistants)
- 7. Partner with patients and families to ensure safe care
- 8. Ensure technology is safe and optimized





Brainstorm Activity





Top 10 Patient Safety List

- Write down your top 10 list of patient safety concerns
 - What keeps you awake at night?
- Be prepared to tell the group
- Compare it to research and literature





Concepts, Theories, and Program Development





What Is Patient Safety?


- Prevention of errors (World Health Organization)
- Avoidance, prevention, and amelioration (National Patient Safety Foundation)
- Freedom from accidental injury (Institute of Medicine)
- Absence of harm (AHRQ)





Sources: WHO; NPSF "Free from Harm"; IOM; AHRQ

Why Errors Happen



Reason's Swiss Cheese model



Generic Error Modeling System (GEMS)

Skill-based error	Rule-based error	Knowledge-based error
1/1,000	1/100	3/10
Slip or lapse when performing a familiar task	Sequence of preestablished steps results in a decision-making error	Figuring it out without rules or experience results in a <i>problem-solving error</i>
Unintentional deviation from planned or routine action	Rules from training experience or procedure that is known are misapplied or not followed	Follows an analytical or logical thought process, because specific rule to follow is unknown
Autopilot	Follow the rules	Don't go there alone



Source: Reason 1990

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Elements of a Safety Program

- Safety culture
- Design safe and reliable processes and systems
- Oversight of program
- Coordination
- Reporting and analysis
- Meaningful metrics
- Elements from across the continuum





Goals for Safety Program

- Improve the culture of safety
- Improve processes and systems







Joint Commission Outlines 11 Tenets of a Safety Culture

- 1. Report and learn from adverse events
- 2. Distinguish human and system errors from unsafe, blameworthy actions
- 3. Ensure that leaders model appropriate behavior and champion efforts
- 4. Enforce and communicate policies that support culture as well as reporting adverse events, close calls, and unsafe conditions



Source: Joint Commission "Sentinel Event Alert 57"

Joint Commission Outlines 11 Tenets of a Safety Culture (con't)

- 5. Recognize team members who report or who have good safety suggestions
- 6. Determine safety culture baseline with reliable tool
- 7. Analyze survey results to find opportunities
- 8. Unit-based initiatives (work station)
- 9. Team training
- 10. Assess system strengths and vulnerabilities
- 11. Repeat culture of safety assessment every 18-24 months



Source: Joint Commission "Sentinel Event Alert 57"

Culture of Patient Safety Survey

- Points to conditions that can result in adverse events
- Increases staff awareness
- Assesses patient safety culture
- Identifies strengths and weaknesses
- Measures improvement over time
- Helps to prioritize and focus





Safety Survey Resources

- AHRQ Medical Office Survey website:
 https://www.ahrq.gov/professionals/quality-patient-safety/patientsafetyculture/medical-office/index.html
- ECRI Institute Clinical Risk Management Program:
 - Get Safe! and Practice Alert resources
 - Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (Ambulatory Program): https://www.ecri.org/components/HRSA/Pages/PSRMPol1.aspx



Safety Culture

INFORMED CULTURE

Those who manage and operate the system have current knowledge about the human, technical, organisational and environmental factors that determine the safety of the system as a whole.

REPORTING CULTURE

An organizational climate in which people are prepared to report their errors and near-misses.

FLEXIBLE CULTURE

A culture in which an organisation is able to reconfigure themselves in the face of high tempo operations or certain kinds of danger - often shifting from the conventional hierarchical mode to a flatter mode.

JUST CULTURE

An atmosphere of trust in which people are encouraged (even rewarded) for providing essential safety-related information, but in which they are also clear about where the line must be drawn between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour.

LEARNING CULTURE

SAFETY

CULTURE

An organisation must possess the willingness and the competence to draw the right conclusions from its safety information system and the will to implement major reforms.



Source: Based on Reason 1997

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
Just Culture

- Emphasizes creating reliable and safe systems and processes
- Just, but not blame-free
- Accountability and culpability





Culpability





Accountability

Human error	At-risk behavior	Reckless behavior	
A <u>product</u> of our current system design and our behavioral choices	A <u>choice</u> in which the risk is believed to be insignificant or justified	A <u>conscious disregard</u> for a substantial and unjustified risk	
Manage through changes in: Choices Processes Procedures Training Environment Design	 Manage through: Removing incentives for the behavior Creating incentives for better choices Increasing situational awareness 	Manage through:Remedial actionPunitive action	
Console	Coach	Punish	





Group Discussion: Culpability and Accountability Case Studies





Case Study 1: Documentation

On Friday at 4 p.m., a walk-in patient complained that the wound on his foot was very painful and had yellow drainage. The provider prescribed a topical antibiotic and a nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory. The provider was in a hurry and didn't document the visit.



Case Study 1: Documentation (con't)

Over the weekend, the wound worsened, the patient was admitted to the hospital, and eventually a toe was amputated.

Three months later when a claim was made, the provider entered a note in the EHR, writing in great detail that the patient refused hospitalization and that an oral antibiotic was prescribed.





How culpable is the provider?

How accountable is the provider?





Case Study 2: Allergies

Patient went for a computed tomography (CT) scan, and the technician checked the EHR for allergies but none were documented.

The tech asked the patient if she had ever had a reaction to contrast media or dyes in the past. The patient said she did get hives, and she was therefore premedicated before the CT scan.



Source: Adapted from PSNET.AHRQ.gov

Case Study 2: Allergies (con't)

During her follow-up at the health center, the patient asked the medical assistant if the allergy to contrast agent had been entered into her EHR. It was not.

Upon investigation the allergy had been removed from the patient's allergy list. The medical assistant had removed the contrast intolerance from the allergy list because it is not a "true" allergy. She intended to find out where to document an intolerance in the EHR but forgot to ask.





How culpable is the provider?

How accountable is the provider?





Design Safe and Reliable Systems

- Design to prevent, intercept, and alleviate errors
- Reduce complexity
- Automate
- Impose constraints, hard stops
- Optimize technology
- Implement barriers or safeguards
- Use alerts, alarms





The Tools: People, Process, and Technology





Tools to Design Safe and Reliable Systems

- Flowcharts
- Process maps
- Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA)
- Risk assessments
- Behavior-based safety
- 5 S's
- Team training
- Technology








Flow Chart Example

Monday



CT report mass identified rule out squamous cell carcinoma sent to Dr. Smith's e-patient list

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Swim Lane Map

Urine testing process

Provider	Medical Assistant	Patient	Laboratory
	Receives notice on task list Identifies patient Instructs patient on collection Writes initials on cup Retrieves specimen Labels specimen Places specimen in bag with a requisition Stores specimen for pick up	Patient voids Leaves specimen in bathroom	Courier picks up specimen Prepare specimen for testing Urine tested Results entered into EHR
EHR Calls results		Receives test results	
Documents treatment plan			





Process Map References

 American Academy of Family Physicians. Process mapping: a how-to primer.

http://www.aafp.org/dam/AAFP/documents/practice management/pcmh/patientcare/PSMSProcessMapping.pdf

Minnesota Department of Health. Swim lane map.
 http://www.health.state.mn.us/divs/opi/qi/toolbox/swimlane.ht
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FMEA

- Proactive
- Structured, systematic approach
- Identifies problems or defects in a process or a service
- Severity
- Detectability
- Probability
- Variety of methodologies and work sheets





Why FMEA?

- Failure modes—What could go wrong?
- Failure cause—Why would a failure occur?
- Failure effects—What would be the outcome of the failure?





FMEA References

- Guidance for performing failure mode and effects analysis with performance improvement projects. https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Provider-Enrollment-and-Certification/QAPI/downloads/GuidanceForFMEA.pdf
- VA National Patient Safety Center. The basics of healthcare failure mode and effect analysis. https://www.patientsafety.va.gov/docs/hfmea/FMEA2.pdf
- Institute for Healthcare Improvement. Interactive FMEA Tool.* http://app.ihi.org/Workspace/tools/fmea/CreateTool.aspx?Template ProcessId=1&Category=10



^{*}Requires registration

FMEA Steps

- 1. Select a topic to analyze
- 2. Form a team
- 3. Create a diagram or visual
- 4. Conduct the analysis, find the failures
- 5. Identify causes and action
- 6. Design a change
- 7. Measure success





What Could Go Wrong?

Provider orders urine test in EHR

Medical Assistant receives order on task list

Medical Assistant identifies patient

Patient voids

- 1. Selects wrong patient
- 2. Selects wrong test
- 3. Selects routine vs. stat
- 4. Doesn't select call results
- 5.Doesn't specify phone number

- 1. Not at computer
- 2. Pt. not assigned to MA
- 3. Busy with procedure

- 1. Used one identifier
- Calls out a name and patient responds
- 3. Uses exam room number not name

- 1.Inadequate amount
- 2. Unable to urinate
- 3. Several patients provide specimens at the same time
- 4.No initials on cup
- 5.Initials get wet
- 6.Puts toilet tissue in cup





FMEA Worksheet

Enter ratings and RPN values in respective columns.

- 1. Flowchart the selected process as it is designed.
- 2. Flowchart the selected process as it is routinely conducted (the actual process).
- 3. List each step and each link between the steps of the intended process in column 5 below.
- 4. Include discrepancies between the flowcharts (steps 1 and 2) in column 6 below.

5. Step of link in process	6. List all potential failure modes	7. Potential effect	8. Severity of effect	9. Frequency of failure	10. Detectability	11. RPN* (8×9×10)	12. Possible causes (from RCA)	13. Recommended redesign
			Severity ratings	Occurrence ratings	Detectability ratings	RPNs		



*RPN = risk priority number



Risk Assessment

- Self-assessments
- Informal patient safety walkround
- Commercially available
- Insurance carriers





Behavior-Based Safety Expectations and Error Prevention Tools

Behavior-based expectations	Error prevention tools			
Pay attention to detail	► STAR (Stop-Think-Act-Review)			
Communicate clearly	Repeat backsClarifying questionPhonetic and numeric clarifications			
Have a questioning attitude	Validate and verify, ask why			
Hand off effectively	Patient/project, plan, purpose, problems, precautions			
Look out for your coworkers	Peer checkingPeer coachingEscalate your concerns			





5 S's For Success

Sort	Determine what is needed, what is not neededEliminate obstacles
Set in order—systematize	Organize, arrange logicallyMake workflow easy
Shine—sanitize	CleanReplace, restore broken
Standardize	Use best practicesMaintain order
Sustain	Keep the orderPerform audits



Source: Adapted from Young

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Team Training

Programs



Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality Advancing Excellence in Health Care

Tools

Data

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Research

Programs Hospitals & Health Systems National Center for Excellence in Primary Care Research

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TeamSTEPPS®

Topics

- About TeamSTEPPS®
- Curriculum Materials
 - ► TeamSTEPPS® 2.0
 - TeamSTEPPS® for Office-Based Care Version
 - TeamSTEPPS® Long-Term Care Version
 - TeamSTEPPS® Dental Module
 - Patients with Limited English Proficiency

TeamSTEPPS® for Office-Based Care Version

TeamSTEPPS® for Office-Based Care offers techniques, tools, and strategies to assist health care professionals in developing and optimizing team knowledge and performance in an office-based care setting. The course is intended for practice facilitators—individuals who play a key role in leading and assisting practices with their quality improvement and practice transformation efforts.

News &

Events

TeamSTEPPS for Office-Based Care adapts the core concepts of the TeamSTEPPS program to reflect the environment of office-based teams. The examples, discussions, and exercises are tailored to the medical office environment. It is a full version of TeamSTEPPS, including all of the fundamentals modules as well as modules to assist in implementation.

RELATED CONTENT

Primary Care Practice **Facilitation Curriculum**



AHRO TeamSTEPPS for Office-Based Care Version:

https://www.ahrg.gov/teamstepps/officebasedcare/index.html

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Safety Benefits of Technology

Drug alerts	Standard orders
Online references	Alerts preventive care
E-prescribing	Automatic recalls
Medication reconciliation	Enhanced communication
Clinical decision support	Rapid deployment of best practices
Test and referral tracking	Quality reports
Abnormal result alerts	Measure clinical performance
Electronic imaging	Drop-down menus
Decrease duplication of tests	Forced functions





Group Discussion: Patient Safety Program





What are the two key elements of a patient safety program?





Adverse Event Reporting and Data Gathering





ECRI Institute Clinical Risk Management Program Toolkits

Clinical Risk Management Services - Tools

Event Reporting Toolkit

Published 12/14/2016

This toolkit provides a model policy on adverse event and near miss reporting, sample event report narrative and data collection forms, an event summary tool, a sample action plan template, and an overview of barriers to event reporting with suggested strategies to overcome barriers that can be used as resources for improving systems for risk identification and analysis.

Toolkit Resources

- Sample Event-Reporting Policy
- Event Reporting Barriers and Strategies
- Event Summary Tool
- Flow of Information Diagram
- Sample Action Plan Template
- Confidential Event Form
- Sample Event Report Narrative
- Event-Report Interview Guidelines





Event Toolkit References

Event reporting toolkit.
 https://www.ecri.org/Components/HRSA/Pages/EventReportToolkit.aspx

Event response toolkit.
 https://www.ecri.org/components/HRSA/Pages/EventResponseToolkit.aspx



Adverse Event: What Were They Thinking?


We know that:

- Systems break down
- Humans make mistakes




















Remove Barriers to Event Reporting

- Policy and procedure
- Reporting systems in place
- Make it easy (short form)
- Nonpunitive
- Trust
- Follow up with reporter
- Make it a "value add"
- Anonymous reporting







Identifying Adverse Events in Primary Care

- Provider reported
- Pharmacist reported
- Patient reported
- Random chart sample
- Assessment of deceased patient records





"We Don't Have Events to Report"

- Your top 10 worst concerns
- Global trigger tool (Institute for Healthcare Improvement)
- FMEA
- Patient safety indicators (AHRQ)
- Complications, complaints, claims
- Quality measures
- Clinical safety rounds
- Regulatory, accreditation





Investigation

- Take immediate action
- Initiate interview process
- Review documents
- Map timeline and process





Interview Process

- Prepare questions
- Prefer in person (private but familiar)
- Ask staff not to discuss among themselves
- Speak with one person at a time
- Be sensitive to staff involved in the adverse event
- Request permission to take notes
- Stress the purpose is to identify system issues
- Practice active listening
- Describe what you normally do when completing the task





Analysis to Action





Analysis

- You can't fix what happened
- You need to know why it happened





Causal Analysis

- Root cause
- Apparent cause
- Common cause







When Should I Conduct an RCA?

- Sentinel events
- Safety assessment code (SAC) matrix
- Significant, serious
- Blameworthy events
- Your worst event or near miss
- Severity
- Frequency
- Trends







VA National Center for Patient Safety: Safety Assessment Code (SAC) Matrix

Catastrophic

Patients with actual or potential:

Death or major permanent loss of function (sensory, motor, physiologic, or intellectual) **not related to the natural course of the patient's illness or underlying condition** (i.e., acts of commission or omission). This includes outcomes that are a direct result of injuries sustained in a fall; or associated with an unauthorized departure from an around-the-clock treatment setting; or the result of an assault or other crime. Any of the adverse events defined by the Joint Commission as reviewable "Sentinel Events" should also be considered in this category (see App. A, subpar. 1b).

Moderate

Patients with actual or potential:

Increased length of stay **or** increased level of care for one or two patients

Major

Patients with actual or potential:

Permanent lessening of bodily functioning (sensory, motor, physiologic, or intellectual) not related to the natural course of the patient's illness or underlying conditions (i.e., acts of commission or omission) or any of the following:

- 1. Disfigurement
- 2. Surgical intervention required
- 3. Increased length of stay for three or more patients
- 4. Increased level of care for three or more patients

Minor

Patients with actual or potential:

No injury, nor increased length of stay nor increased level of care

Source: VA National Center for Patient Safety "Safety Assessment Code"





Root-Cause Analysis

- What happened?
- Why did it happen?
- What are we going to do about it?





Types of Root-Cause Analysis

- Joint Commission
- SWARM
- 5 Why's
- Human Factors Analysis Classification System (HFACS)



Sources: Li et al.; Joint Commission "Framework"

5 Why's

Problem Statement	(One-sentence description of event or problem) Patient's abnormal sinus CT scan report was delayed for more than 14 days
Why?	Ordering physician was on vacation and radiology center entered the abnormal test results to the patient's EHR and flagged the ordering physician's task list
Why?	Ordering physician and covering provider were trained that test results would automatically default to covering provider's task list for follow-up
Why?	The sinus CT scan report did not automatically default to the covering provider
Why?	There was an EHR upgrade; the automatic default malfunctioned and was turned off
Why?	The test results module and interface were not tested following the upgrade
Root cause(s)	Malfunction after EHR upgrade went unnoticed No failsafe process to monitor that test results are being reviewed by provider or covering providers



Source: Adapted from CMS




Using Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS)

5. Summary of Nanocodes					
# Nanocodes	Nanocode short description	Subcategory	Category	# Nanocodes/ category	
	Skill-based error		Unsafe acts		
	Judgment/decision making	Error			
	Misperception				
	Routine (bending rules)	Violations			
	Exceptional (breaking rules)				
	Physical factors	Environmental	Preconditions for		
	Technological factors	factors	unsafe acts		
	Adverse mental states	Condition of the			
	Adverse physiological state	operator			
	Chronic performance limitations	орегатог			
	Communication/coordination/planning	Personnel factors			
	Fitness for duty				
	Inadequate supervision	(Supervision		
	Planned inappropriate operations				
	Failure to address known problem				
	Supervisory violations				
	Resource/acquisition management		Organizational		
	Organizational climate		influences		
	Organizational processes				





Human Factors Analysis Classification System (HFACS) Framework







Root-Cause Analysis References

 Joint Commission. Framework for conducting a root cause analysis and action plan.

https://www.jointcommission.org/framework for conducting a root cause analysis and action plan/

SWARM:

Li J, Boulanger B, Norton J, et al. "SWARMing" to improve patient care: a novel approach to root cause analysis. Jt Comm J Qual Patient Saf 2015 Nov;41(11):494-501. https://psnet.ahrq.gov/resources/resource/29489

• 5 Why's tool for root cause analysis. https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Provider-Enrollment-and-Certification/QAPI/downloads/FiveWhys.pdf





Group Activity: Actions to Take to Prevent Recurrence

How do we know what actions to take?





Action Plans

- Linked to the identified cause
- One action item for each root cause
- Redesign using best practices and established science
- Select strong or weak interventions
- Track who, what, when, where, how
- Implement
- Measure





Action Plan

- Assign an individual to implement action plan
- This individual should have authority to effect change
- Permanent
- Resources
- Timeframes








Types of Actions

- Remedial actions—don't necessarily address the cause
- Interim actions—short-term actions to reduce risk during implementation of long-term actions
- Corrective actions—address the root cause, and as a result, prevent recurrence of the event







Hierarchy of Error Reduction Strategies

Strong actions	Intermediate actions	Weaker actions
Not dependent on humans to get it right	Doesn't fully control for human error	Relies solely on human action
Physical	Cognitive	Information
Permanent	Procedural	Temporary
Forces the person to get it right	Helps the person remember	Informs, alerts, prompts the person
Eliminates the chance to choose the wrong option	Serves as a guide	Action left up to personal interpretation



Source: Adapted from VA National Center for Patient Safety "Root Cause Analysis"



Examples of Error Reduction Actions

Strong actions	Intermediate actions	Weaker actions
Forced functions	Redundancy	Warning signs and labels
Automation/ technology	Checklists/reminders	New or longer policies
Physical	Eliminate look-alikes/ sound-alikes	New procedures or rules
Simplify the process	Enhanced communication	Training
Remove unnecessary	Software enhancement	Additional analysis/study
Standardize equipment	Eliminate distractions	Memos
Failsafe mechanisms	Minimize choices	Be more careful
Architectural	Increase detectability	Documentation





How Will We Know Whether the Action We Took Makes a Difference?

- Collect measures of intended outcome
- Determine which method
- Determine frequency of measurement/data collection
- Monitor for a predetermined period
- Define reporting hierarchy





Measures of Effectiveness

- Ensures the new process is carried out as planned
- Process measure: how you know that the action is actually taking place
- Outcomes measure: the effectiveness of the action in achieving the expected results








Sustaining Improvements

- Formal follow-up process of RCA recommendations
- Patient involvement
- Metrics/measures
- Technology
- Board involvement
- Walkrounds/visibility
- Simulations and drills
- New top 10 list





Communication and Monitoring

- Huddle (stand-up meetings)
- Safety message boards
- Interactive sessions with staff
- Tell stories about patient/staff (voice of the customer)
- Opportunities to relive accomplishments
- Patient newsletter/education
- Formal report to risk management committee





Summary

- Identify your top 10 patient safety concerns
- After analysis, take action
- Opt for strong actions over weak
- Measure for success and sustainability
- Share this information with 3 people







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Thank You

Additional Questions?

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